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Abstract
What explains the world-wide trend of pro-entrepreneurial policies in the last few decades?
We study entrepreneurial policy in a lobbying model taking into account the conﬂict of inter-
est between entrepreneurs and incumbents. It is shown that international market integration
leads to more pro-entrepreneurial policies. It becomes more diﬃcult to protect the proﬁts
of incumbent ﬁrms from entrepreneurial entry and pro-entrepreneurial policies make for-
eign entrepreneurs less aggressive. Making use of the Doing Business database, we ﬁnd,
consistent with our theory, evidence that international openness reduces barriers to entry
for new entrepreneurs and that the eﬀect is stronger in countries with more rent-seeking
governments.
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In the last few decades, entrepreneurship has emerged as a key issue in the policy arena.1
This marks a distinct break against traditional industrial policy which has focused on large
established ￿rms. The magnitude of the shift towards more pro-entrepreneurial policies is
revealed in data from the World Bank￿ s Doing Business project. Figure I shows how the costs
incurred in the process of a start-up of a new ￿rm, as a share of the country￿ s GDP per capita,
in 72 countries have evolved over recent years (Djankov et. al, 2002). On average, the cost of
starting a new business declined by more than 6 percent per annum over the period 2003-08.
Panel B of Figure I shows that the decline among OECD countries has been even more dramatic.
￿ ￿ ￿[ FIGURE I] ￿ ￿ ￿
We propose that the shift towards more pro-entrepreneurial policies can be explained by
international market integration. The starting point of the analysis is the process of international
integration of product and innovation markets during the last few decades, which has been driven
both by policy changes such as WTO agreements (e.g. TRIPS) and the EU single market
program, and by technology advances reducing international transportation and transaction
costs.
Can international market integration a⁄ect entrepreneurship policy? Industrial policy as
endogenous outcomes of international integration has previously been studied in the two large
literatures on international R&D competition and lobbying for protection; emanating from sem-
inal contributions by Brander and Spence (1983) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). However,
these literatures have abstracted from the entrepreneur as a source of innovations. We study the
e⁄ects of international integration on entrepreneurial policies taking into account the within-
country con￿ ict of interest between independent entrepreneurs and incumbent ￿rms. The latter
have an incentive to protect their position on the product market and to preserve status quo,
they can lobby a policy maker to set a fee (barriers) on entrepreneurial entry.
Comparing policy outcome in autarchy with outcome in a situation where product markets
and innovation markets are integrated, we establish two mechanisms that make the policy
more pro-entrepreneurial as markets integrate internationally. First, integration implies that
1The Economist (14th March 2009) recently published a special report on entrepreneurship, "Global Heroes",
describing this phenomenon.
2incumbents now also face the threat that foreign innovation may challenge their position. This
foreign innovation threat e⁄ect reduces the incentive to lobby for protection against the domestic
entrepreneur. Second, integration introduces an interaction between entrepreneurs in di⁄erent
countries since the value of one innovation depends on the presence on rivalling innovations.
This strategic innovation e⁄ort e⁄ect tends to push policies in a pro-entrepreneurial direction.
The reason is that erecting barriers against the domestic entrepreneur has the negative side
e⁄ect of making market entry more pro￿table for foreign innovators.
We also identify counteracting e⁄ects of international market integration that could make
policies more anti-entrepreneurial. If integration increases incumbents￿total pro￿ts, this en-
hances their willingness to pay to protect their market. However, we show that this market size
e⁄ect is dominated by the foreign innovation threat e⁄ect and the strategic innovation e⁄ort ef-
fect as long as the integrated product market does not become too concentrated due to mergers
and exits.
With respect to lobbying, governments di⁄er substantially in how sensitive they are to the
interest of less organized agents in the economy, notably consumers. Consumer welfare consider-
ations are likely to induce more pro-entrepreneurial policies, since innovations bene￿t consumers
through lower prices and a higher quality of products. The importance attached to consumer
welfare is shown to a⁄ect international integration; the more weight a government puts on con-
sumer welfare, the weaker is the reduction in entrepreneurial fees due to integration of markets.
This is due to an international consumer welfare free-riding e⁄ect of foreign innovations.
We test the prediction of a negative relationship between barriers to entry for entrepreneurs
and international market integration using the Doing Business cost of starting a ￿rm as a
measure of entrepreneurship policy. Our theoretical concept of international integration entails
both the integration of product markets and innovation markets. Consistent with this, we draw
on broad indices of globalization in the empirical analysis, using the kof index, provided by the
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, and the csgr index, provided by University of
Warwick. Both indices cover more than 120 countries over the period 1999-2004 and combine
components of trade ￿ ows and foreign direct investment (FDI) ￿ ows, data on international
personal contacts and information ￿ ows and involvement in international organizations.
We ￿nd a strong negative correlation between barriers to entry for entrepreneurs and the
degree of international integration of the respective countries. More open countries have lower
barriers to entry for new ￿rms. This correlation holds within countries over time, also when
3controlling for a general time trend. It is also robust to including country-speci￿c measures
of general institutional liberalization. We also ￿nd evidence that countries with governments
that are likely to put less emphasis on consumer welfare (more corrupt countries) reduce their
entrepreneurship policies much more in response to an increase in integration.
Moreover, using the fact that ten countries in our sample entered the European Union in
2004, we can devise a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach. We argue that the selection of new
members was exogenous and that new EU-members were integrated on the common market
but not forced to reduce barriers to new ￿rm entry. The steep decline in barriers to entry in
the ten countries, subsequent to becoming members, can thus be interpreted as a causal e⁄ect
of integration on entrepreneurship policy.
Innovations introduced by independent entrepreneurs, and the start-up of new ￿rms, play
an important role in an economy￿ s innovation system.2 Indeed, the entrepreneurship literature
has proposed that the entrepreneur has returned as a prominent player in the economy￿ s inno-
vation system in the last few decades (Baumol 2002, 2004; Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991).
One of the most frequently cited reasons for the increased importance of entrepreneurship is
globalization (e.g. Gilbert et al., 2004). The speci￿c link between globalization and actual
policy outcome has nevertheless been neglected. We contribute to this literature by providing
a theory explaining the pro-entrepreneurial policy shift as a response to international market
integration and providing empirical support for the proposed mechanism.
Our paper relates to the literature on international protection for sale (Grossman and Help-
man, 1994; Imai, Katayama and Krishna, 2008; Bombardini, 2008; Goldberg and Maggi, 1999).3
This literature has shown that higher import penetration reduces the incentive for import pro-
tection in industries that wield political in￿ uence. We di⁄er from this literature by treating the
level of trade protection as exogenous. Instead, we focus on the e⁄ect of internationalization
on incumbents￿incentives for protection against domestic entrepreneurial entry. By showing
that domestic entry barriers can be lowered due to international integration, we provide an
additional channel through which globalization a⁄ects economic policy.
2Moreover, using a sample period of 1965-1992, Kortum and Lerner (2000) found that VC investments, which
support small innovative ￿rms, have a positive impact on patent count at the industry level, and that this positive
impact is larger than that of R&D expenditures. Hirukawa and Ueda (2008) ￿nd similar results when extending
the sample period to 2001.
3Our paper is also related to the literature on ￿nancial development and internationalization, in particular
Rajan and Zingales (2003). They present empirical evidence that openness can explain the development of
￿nancial markets over long periods of time. Perotti and Volpin (2007) and Bebchuk and Neeman (2007) formally
endogenize investor protection in models with interest groups.
4This paper also contributes to the literature on international R&D policy competition (e.g.
Brander and Spence, 1983; Eaton and Grossman, 1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Haa-
land and Kind, 2008; Leahy and Neary, 2008). This literature has explored how international
competition a⁄ects incentives for governments to subsidize incumbent R&D and has identi￿ed a
"business stealing e⁄ect" that increases the incentive for R&D subsidies when international com-
petition increases. We di⁄er by examining the e⁄ects of R&D policy when R&D is conducted by
independent entrepreneurs rather than incumbents.4 We then add to this literature by showing
that international market integration can increase the incentive for pro-entrepreneurial policies
(e.g. R&D subsidies) due to a foreign innovation threat e⁄ect and a strategic innovation ef-
fort e⁄ect (similar to the business stealing e⁄ect) and by providing empirical support for the
proposed mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the ￿rst theoretical and empirical work
explaining the variation in formal entry barriers over time. The data on entry regulation from the
World Bank￿ s Doing Business survey has been extensively used in the literature (for an overview,
see the Appendix, Table A.2). Primarily, it has been used to study the e⁄ect of institutions on
growth (Freund and Bolaky, 2008), corruption (Svensson, 2005) and industrial structure and
dynamics (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2006; Barseghyan, 2008; Ciccone and Papaopannou,
2007).5 Although the correlation between openness and entry barriers has been noted in earlier
literature, the entry costs have been treated as an exogenous underlying institutional feature.
The model is spelled out in Section 2. Section 3 studies how international market integration
a⁄ects the incentive to set entrepreneurial policy. We extend the base model in Section 4. The
extensions we consider are: (i) policy competition between governments, and (ii) entrepreneurial
innovation for sale instead of entry. The empirical analysis is conducted in Section 5. Section
6 concludes the paper.
4An exception is Impullitti (2009) which, to our knowledge, is the only paper in the endogenous growth
literature studying how R&D subsidies (policy) are a⁄ected by international competition, and which allows both
entrants and incumbents to undertake R&D. Focusing on long-run dynamic e⁄ects, the author solves the model
by calibration and shows that increased foreign competition (more foreign ￿rms) increases R&D subsidies due
to a business stealing e⁄ect (our strategic innovation e⁄ort e⁄ect) and a growth e⁄ect. We di⁄er by focusing on
the direct e⁄ect which enables us to derive analytical solutions and empirically testable predictions. Moreover,
studying the e⁄ects of both product market and innovation market integration enables us to identify four di⁄erent
e⁄ects of international integration: a foreign innovation threat e⁄ect and a strategic innovation e⁄ort e⁄ect which
increase R&D subsidies and a market size e⁄ect and a consumer welfare free-riding e⁄ect that may reduce R&D
subsidies.
5Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) used entry barriers to construct an instrumental variable for the
existence of bilateral trade between two partners. They argue that high entry costs in two countries substantially
reduce the probability of the two countries exporting to each other.
52. Entrepreneurship policy in autarchy
We begin by considering an industry in autarchy and then turn to examining the e⁄ect of
globalization. Consider a closed oligopolistic industry with n domestic incumbents and a do-
mestic entrepreneur who can potentially enter the market. In stage 1, the incumbents and the
entrepreneur lobby in order to in￿ uence a policy maker. The policy implemented a⁄ects the
pro￿tability of entrepreneurial ventures through an entry fee. The policy maker￿ s objective is
to maximize lobbying contributions and revenues from the entry fee (subsidy). In stage 2, the
entrepreneur expends e⁄ort to increase the probability of making an innovation with a ￿xed
quality k > 0. In stage 3, a successful entrepreneur enters the market and in stage 4, the entre-
preneur competes with incumbents on the oligopolistic product market. If the entrepreneur is
not successful, incumbents remain in status quo. We proceed by solving the game backwards.
2.1. Product market interaction (stage 4)
Firms are indexed j 2 I[E where the entrepreneurial ￿rm is assigned the index j = E and the
set of index numbers for domestic incumbent ￿rms is j = i 2 I. The product market pro￿t of
￿rm j is represented by ￿j(x : k), where k > 0 is the inherent quality of the innovation used
by an entrepreneurial ￿rm. The vector x contains actions for all ￿rms selling to the product
market. Firm j chooses an action xj 2 R+ to maximize its product market pro￿t ￿j(x : k).
Action xj may be considered as setting a quantity or a price; exit is equivalent to inaction.
We assume there to exist a unique Nash-Equilibrium, de￿ned as:
￿j(~ xj; ~ x￿j : k) ￿ ￿j(xj; ~ x￿j : k); (2.1)
where ~ x￿j is the set of optimal actions taken by j￿ s rivals. From (2.1), we can de￿ne a reduced-
form product market pro￿t for a ￿rm j,
￿j (k) ￿ ￿j(~ xj(k); ~ x￿j(k) : k): (2.2)
We need to distinguish between two states: one where entrepreneurial entry has occurred and
one where all ￿rms are incumbents. When entry by the entrepreneur occurs in stage 3, the
interaction involves ￿rms indexed j 2 I[E. Thus, there are two types of ￿rms: one is the
6entrepreneurial ￿rm which is making a pro￿t ￿Aut
E (k) ￿ 0, and the other is an incumbent ￿rm
with a pro￿t ￿Aut
i (k) ￿ 0. When no entry takes place, incumbents have the pro￿t ￿Aut
i (0) ￿ 0.
The argument k = 0 indicates that the entrepreneur has not entered the market.
The pro￿ts of both the entrepreneur and the incumbent ￿rms are dependent on the quality
of the innovation, k. The innovation enables the entrepreneur to enter the market and make
a pro￿t, ￿E (k) > F > ￿E (0). But entry will also reduce the incumbents￿pro￿t and possibly
lead to exits of incumbents. As the quality of the innovation improves, the entrepreneurial ￿rm
will strengthen its position vis-￿-vis incumbent ￿rms, which will further reduce the incumbents￿
pro￿ts and possibly lead to further exit. Let ￿I(0) =
Pn
i pi(0)￿i(0) be the expected aggre-
gate incumbent pro￿t where pi(0) is the probability that incumbent i remains on the market.
Moreover, let ￿I(k) =
Pn
i pi(k)￿i(k) be the expected aggregate incumbent pro￿t where pi(k) is
the probability that incumbent i remains on the market under entry. We then assume that in-
cumbents￿aggregate expected pro￿ts are reduced by entrepreneurial entry, ￿Aut
I (0) > ￿Aut
I (k):
Thus, the aggregate expected pro￿t of incumbent ￿rms will be smaller if the entrepreneur par-
ticipates in the product market competition. This yields incentives for incumbents to lobby
against innovation.
2.2. Entry by entrepreneur (stage 3)
In stage 3, a successful entrepreneur enters the market if the ￿xed cost of entry F is lower than
the subsequent product market pro￿t. In what follows, we will assume k to be su¢ ciently large
so that entry always occurs when the entrepreneur succeeds with its innovation, ￿Aut
E (k) =
￿Aut
E (k) ￿ F > 0.
2.3. Innovation (stage 2)
The entrepreneur undertakes an e⁄ort, e, to discover an innovation with ￿xed quality, k. Let
innovation costs y(e) be an increasing convex function in e⁄ort, i.e. y0; y00 > 0. The probability
of making an innovation is given by a function z(e) 2 [0;1], where z is an increasing concave
function in own e⁄ort, z0 > 0; z00 < 0. Inactivity is a feasible action for the entrepreneur with
z(0) = 0 and y(0) = 0. The entrepreneur makes an e⁄ort decision given an entry fee policy ￿
set by the government policy in stage 1. The policy reduces the pro￿t by a ￿xed amount ￿, if
the entrepreneur innovates successfully. A ￿xed ￿ is assumed since it ￿ts our empirical data.
Alternatively, we could set ￿ to be proportional to entrepreneurial pro￿ts. This adds a scaling
7e⁄ect, but does not change any signs of our results.6
The entrepreneur then solves the following problem,7
max:
e WE = z(e)
￿
￿Aut
E (k) ￿ ￿
￿
￿ y(e); (2.3)







E (k) ￿ ￿
￿
￿ y0
e = 0; (2.4)
which implicitly de￿nes an optimal e⁄exort level e(￿). The optimal e⁄ort level is decreasing in
the entry fee, e0
￿ < 0:8 Since z(￿) = z(e(￿)), with z0
￿ = z0
ee0
￿ < 0, the probability of a successful
innovation is also decreasing in the entry fee.
To proceed, it will be useful to de￿ne the reduced-form expected pro￿ts for the entrepreneur





E (￿) = z(￿)
￿
￿Aut




I (￿) = [1 ￿ z(￿)]￿Aut
I (0) + z(￿)￿Aut
I (k):
(2.5)
2.4. Entrepreneurial policy (stage 1)
We will assume a rent maximizing government (in Section 3.6 we will examine the case of a
total surplus maximizing government). The objective function of the policy maker G is the sum
of social welfare and the sum of lobbying contributions from entrepreneurs and incumbents:




where W(￿) = ￿z(￿), i.e. social welfare is simply the government expected income from entry
fees. We assume that incumbent ￿rms can organize themselves as an interest group and make
a joint lobbying contribution. Hence, the entrepreneur and the incumbent lobbying group give
the government a contribution schedule, LE(￿) and LI(￿), respectively. For all values of ￿,
these schedules give the lobbying contribution each party is willing to pay.
The lobbying contribution from group h, Lh(￿), is derived as follows. Let G￿h(￿) =
6Derivations are available from the authors upon request.
7Note that the entrepreneur￿ s pro￿t is reduced by the amount spent on lobbying. In stage 2, this is a sunk
cost which does not enter into the entrepreneur￿ s problem.
8Which directly follows from di⁄erentiation of (2.4) and the assumptions on z(:) and y(:).
8L￿h(￿)+W(￿) be the government￿ s objective function when group h does not lobby, and de￿ne
the optimal fee for the policy maker without group being h present as ￿Gov
￿h = argmax￿ G￿h(￿).
Then, group h can only induce the government to choose another policy ￿ 6= ￿Gov
￿h by compen-
sating the government by an amount:
Ch(￿) = G￿h(￿Gov
￿h ) ￿ G￿h(￿): (2.7)
Given the lobbying contribution o⁄ered by the other lobby group, the optimal entry fee for
group h is then ￿
opt
h = argmax￿ WAut
h (￿) ￿ Ch(￿), where WAut
h (￿) is given from (2.5). Which
lobbying contribution will then be chosen? We will restrict the lobbying contributions to be
"regret free" or "truthful". This implies that we restrict the set of possible lobbying o⁄ers Lh(￿)








h (￿) ￿ Lh(￿) = WAut
h (￿
opt
h ) ￿ C(￿
opt
h ) = ￿ ￿h: (2.8)
Given that the contributions Lh(￿) are such that the entrepreneur (h = E) and the incumbent
￿rms (h = I) are both indi⁄erent between the o⁄ered fee ￿ and their optimal fees ￿
opt
h , (2.8)
constitutes a Nash-equilibrium in o⁄ered lobbying schedules (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986;
Grossman and Helpman, 1994). From (2.8), we can now solve for the equilibrium lobbying
contribution Lh(￿):
Lh(￿) = WAut
h (￿) ￿ ￿ ￿h: (2.9)
Inserting (2.9) into (2.6), we can rewrite the objective function as:
G(￿) = ￿z(￿) + WAut
I (￿) + WAut
E (￿) ￿ ￿ ￿Aut
I ￿ ￿ ￿Aut
E : (2.10)
The policy maker sets a fee ￿ so as to maximize G(￿) and thereby, from (2.9), implicitly also
the lobbying contributions of the entrepreneur, LE(￿); and the incumbent ￿rms, LI(￿). The
￿rst-order condition of (2.10), using (2.5) and taking into account the optimal e⁄ort by the

















An increase in entry fees will reduce the entrepreneurial e⁄ort and hence, decrease the proba-
9bility of a successful innovation, z0
￿ = z0
ee0
￿ < 0. The ￿rst term re￿ ects the consequences of this
in terms of reduced policy revenues, z0
￿￿Aut < 0. The second term represents the increase in the
incumbents￿expected pro￿t and hence, the increase in lobbying contributions from incumbents,





I (0) ￿ ￿Aut
I (k)
￿
> 0. From (2.11), we obtain the optimal policy in autarchy:
￿Aut = ￿Aut
I (0) ￿ ￿Aut
I (k) > 0: (2.12)
In autarchy the fee will, in other words, be set equal to the loss of incumbents caused by an
innovation.
3. Globalization and barriers to entrepreneurship
Let us now examine the impact of globalization on the optimal entry fees, ￿. For expositional
reasons, we ￿rst model the optimal entry fee in one country, taking the entrepreneurial policy
in the rest of the world as given, ￿ ￿￿. This assumption is relaxed in Section 3.5. We capture
globalization as an integration of product and innovation markets. Product market integration
is modeled as competition between ￿rms, domestic and foreign, on an integrated product mar-
ket. Innovation market integration is captured by competition between domestic and foreign
entrepreneurs for making innovations and thus a subsequent market entry. We will assume that
entrepreneurial entry on the integrated product market requires a global patent for the innova-
tion, k. Even if entrepreneurs from both countries are successful, only one of them will obtain
a global patent (and enter the product market). This patent right is then allocated by a 50-50
lottery. Other assumptions that we impose are that neither incumbents nor entrepreneurs can
engage in cross-border lobbying and that the policy makers in the two countries are not able to
cooperate. We discuss the e⁄ects of cross-border lobbying in Section 4.1.
3.1. Integration of product markets (stage 4)
In the integrated product market, let the set of indices for foreign incumbents and the entrepre-
neur be denoted I￿ and E￿, while I and E represent domestic incumbents and the entrepreneur,
respectively. Product market competition may then entail ￿rms indexed j 2 I[I￿, j 2 I[I￿[E
10or j 2 I [ I￿ [ E￿: In either case, the Nash-equilibrium is given as:
￿Int
j (~ xj; ~ x￿j : k) ￿ ￿Int
j (xj; ~ x￿j : k); (3.1)
from which we de￿ne a reduced-form pro￿t ￿Int
j (k) ￿ ￿Int
j (~ xj(k); ~ x￿j(k) : k). In what follows,
we will once more assume that incumbents￿aggregate expected pro￿ts are reduced by entry, i.e.
￿Int
I (0) > ￿Int
I (k).
3.2. Entry (stage 3)
In stage 3, a successful entrepreneur enters the market at a ￿xed cost. It is once more assumed
that ￿Int
E (k) = ￿Int
E (k) ￿ F > 0 if the domestic entrepreneur is successful, and ￿Int
E￿ (k) =
￿Int
E￿ (k) ￿ F￿ > 0 if a foreign entrepreneur is successful.
3.3. Entrepreneurial innovation (stage 2)
The domestic and foreign entrepreneur both expend e⁄ort to innovate. Let the e⁄ort by the
foreign entrepreneur be denoted e￿. The foreign entrepreneur￿ s probability of success is deter-
mined by the same function as that of the domestic entrepreneur, z(￿). We can then write the
probability that the domestic entrepreneur successfully enters as zwin
E (e;e￿) = z(e)[1 ￿ z(e￿)]+
0:5z(e)z(e￿), where z(e)[1 ￿ z(e￿)] is the probability of entry if the domestic entrepreneur alone
is successful and 0:5z(e)z(e￿) is the probability of the domestic entrepreneur winning the lottery
in case of simultaneous innovations. Simplifying, we obtain zwin
E (e;e￿) = z(e)[1 ￿ 0:5z(e￿)]. The
probability that the foreign entrepreneur enters the integrated market is symmetric, zwin
E￿ (e;e￿) =
z(e￿)[1 ￿ 0:5z(e)].















E (k) ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ y(e￿): (3.3)







E (k) ￿ ￿
￿
￿ y0






E￿ (k) ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ y0
e￿ = 0: (3.5)
11From (3.4) and (3.5), the optimal entrepreneurial e⁄orts can be derived as functions of the
domestic entry fee, e(￿) and e￿(￿). In the Appendix, we show that (3.4) and (3.5) imply that
entrepreneurial e⁄orts e and e￿ are strategic substitutes:9 more e⁄ort expended by the foreign
entrepreneur, e￿, reduces the e⁄ort of the domestic entrepreneur, e. It also follows that an
increase in the entry fee ￿ for the domestic entrepreneur must reduce the optimal e⁄ort by the
domestic entrepreneur, while increasing the optimal e⁄ort of its foreign rival, e0
￿ < 0 and e￿0
￿ > 0.
Noting that z(￿) = z(e(￿)) and z￿(￿) = z(e￿(￿)); and assuming that the stability criteria of the
Nash-equilibrium in (3.4) and (3.5) are met, we have the following result:
Lemma 1. Increasing the entry fee ￿ for the domestic entrepreneur increases the e⁄ort by the
foreign entrepreneur and the probability of foreign entry, while decreasing the e⁄ort level and
the probability of domestic entry, z0￿
￿ = z0
e￿e￿0




Proof. See the Appendix.
Once more, it will be useful to de￿ne a reduced-form expected pro￿t for the entrepreneur and
the incumbents as a function of the entry fee, ￿. Let zwin
E (￿) be the reduced-form probability
that the domestic entrepreneur wins and let zentry(￿) be the reduced-form probability that





E (￿) = z(e(￿))[1 ￿ 0:5z(e￿(￿))]




















I (0) + zentry(￿)￿Int
I (k):
(3.7)
3.4. Entrepreneurial Policy (Stage 1)
In the integrated market, each government maximizes the sum of social welfare and the sum
of lobbying contributions from entrepreneurs and incumbents, choosing its entry fee taking as
given the entry fee of the other government. To highlight the e⁄ects of globalization, assume
that only domestic ￿rms can lobby against the domestic policy maker. As previously men-
tioned, for expositional reasons we ￿rst model the optimal entry fee in one country taking the
9If entrepreneurial e⁄ort instead involved spill-overs, thus enhancing the performance of the other entrepreneur,
we could have a situation where entrepreneurial e⁄orts are strategic complements. This would change the sign
on the strategic innovation e⁄ort e⁄ect discussed in the next subsection .
12entrepreneurial policy in the rest of the world as given, ￿ ￿￿. These assumptions are relaxed
below.
The lobbying game then has the same structure as in autarchy. Thus, in integrated markets,
the objective function of the policy maker in (2.10) now becomes:
max
￿ G = zwin
E (￿)￿ + WInt
I (￿) + WInt
E (￿) ￿ ￿ ￿Int
I ￿ ￿ ￿Int
E ; (3.8)




h ) ￿ Ch(￿
opt
h ) are constants de￿ned as
the optimal (net) pro￿t for the entrepreneur and the incumbent lobby.
Using the entrepreneur￿ s optimality condition (3.4), the reduced-form probabilities in (3.6)
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To infer the e⁄ect of globalization on entrepreneurial policy, it is instructive to compare the
￿rst-order condition under integrated markets in (3.9) to that under autarchy in (2.11).
The ￿rst line in (3.9) once more re￿ ects the trade-o⁄ between a lower expected income from
the entry fee and the increase in lobbying contributions from incumbents (when the domestic
entrepreneur reduces her innovation e⁄ort in response to an increase in the fee). However, as
compared to autarchy, both e⁄ects are discounted by the presence of the foreign entrepreneur,
where we note that the gain in the lobby contributions is more heavily discounted than the loss
in entry fees, since (1 ￿ 0:5z￿) > (1 ￿ z￿). The key is that incumbents lose their ￿ gain￿from
domestic lobbying each time the foreign entrepreneur is successful, whereas the loss in entry fee
will not be eliminated each time the foreign entrepreneur is successful, since it might lose the
lottery against the domestic entrepreneur if it is also successful. This is what we refer to as the
foreign innovation threat e⁄ect.
The second line in (3.9) adds new e⁄ects as compared to autarchy. Both represent reductions
in lobby contributions due to the presence of the foreign entrepreneur. We refer to them as
strategic innovation e⁄ort e⁄ects. The ￿rst term in the second line represents a decrease in
lobbying contributions from incumbents, emerging from the fact that increasing the entry fee
increases the e⁄ort by the foreign entrepreneur and hence, the probability of a foreign innovation.
13The second term captures an incentive for the entrepreneur to lobby more to avoid the risk of
losing the patent lottery. The entrepreneur has an incentive to lobby for low fees, committing
to a high e⁄ort in stage 2 and thus keeping down the e⁄ort of the foreign entrepreneur.
Let us now examine if integration reduces entry barriers. From (3.9), we can solve for the
entry fee under integration and compare it to the autarchy fee in (2.12):
￿Aut ￿ ￿Int =
￿
￿Aut


















In (3.10), the ￿rst term spells out the entry fee under autarchy while the second term is the
entry fee under integration. In the integrated market, the entry fee trades o⁄ the reduction
in incumbents￿pro￿t and the creation of entrepreneurial rents. Note that in the integrated







￿ > 0 > z0
￿ and z;z￿ 2 [0;1], it follows that ￿I 2 (0;1). The term ￿I re￿ ects a reduction
in lobby contributions from incumbents which realize that stopping the domestic entrepreneur
is worth less due to the probability of foreign entry. Moreover, attempts at decreasing the
innovation e⁄ort of the domestic entrepreneur have the negative side e⁄ect of amplifying the




￿(1￿0:5z￿) < 0 re￿ ects the fact that entry fees are kept
down by lobbying contributions from the domestic entrepreneur which has an incentive to avoid
losing a patent lottery against the foreign entrepreneur.
From (3.10), we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If incumbent losses from entry in the integrated market ￿Int
I (k)￿￿Int
I (0) are
not substantially larger than incumbent losses from entry in autarchy ￿Aut
I (k) ￿ ￿Aut
I (0) then,
due to a foreign innovation threat e⁄ect and a strategic innovation e⁄ort e⁄ect, entry barriers
will be lower in the integrated market, ￿Aut ￿ ￿Int > 0:
Proof. Using (2.12) and (3.10), we can rewrite ￿Aut ￿ ￿Int > 0 as:
￿Int
I (k) ￿ ￿Int
I (0)
￿Aut











I (k) ￿ ￿Aut
I (0)
> 1; (3.11)










Proposition 1 suggests that international integration will reduce the barriers to entry for
entrepreneurs since such barriers, all else equal, promote opportunistic behavior by foreign
14entrepreneurs and reduce the lobby contributions of incumbents. The in￿ uence by the foreign
entrepreneur may lead to lower entry barriers in integrated markets than in autarchy, even when
incumbents￿losses from entry is higher in the integrated market.
Whether incumbent losses from entry are higher in the integrated market than in autarchy
depends on the underlying assumptions made in the oligopoly model. Below, we will provide a
linear Cournot model where (3.11) is ful￿lled and ￿Aut￿￿Int > 0. We will also use this model to
show the existence of Nash-equilibrium in entry fees ￿Int and ￿Int￿
such that ￿Int = ￿Int￿
< ￿Aut.
Moreover, we will show that if international integration is followed by a su¢ ciently large product
market concentration due to mergers or exit, international integration will increase the entry
barriers, i.e. ￿Aut ￿ ￿Int < 0:
3.5. A parametric example
In the Linear-Cournot model (LC-model), there are two symmetric countries, each with n
incumbents. The oligopoly interaction in period 4 is Cournot competition in homogenous goods.
The product market pro￿t is ￿m
j = (Pm ￿ cj)qm




j=1 qj, for m = fAut;Intg, where a > 0 is a demand parameter, sm may be interpreted
as the size of the market with sAut = s and sInt = 2s. Nm is the total number of ￿rms in the
market. There are no exits of incumbents. Thus, in autarchy, N(k)Aut = n+1 > N(0)Aut = n,
whereas in the integrated market, NInt(k) = 2n + 1 > NAut(0) = 2n.
Ownership of the innovation reduces the marginal cost. Making a distinction between ￿rm
types, we have:
cI = c; cE = c ￿ k: (3.12)






s = 0 8j, m = Aut;Int, which




implies Pm￿cj = ￿
qm
j
sm, reduced-form pro￿ts are quadratic in own output, ￿m













, with optimal quantities given as:
~ qAut
E (k) = s
￿+(n+1)k
n+2 ~ qAut
j (k) = s￿￿k
n+2 ~ qAut
j (0) = s ￿
n+1
~ qInt
E (k) = 2s
￿+(2n+1)k
2n+2 ~ qInt
j (k) = 2s ￿￿k
2n+2 ~ qInt
j (0) = 2s ￿
2n+1;
(3.13)
where ￿ = a ￿ c. We have the following Lemma:
15Lemma 2. In the linear Cournot model with symmetric countries and with ￿ ￿￿ being exogenous,
￿Aut
I (k) ￿ ￿Aut
I (0) > ￿Int
I (k) ￿ ￿Int
I (0), which from (3.11) implies that ￿Aut ￿ ￿Int > 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
By assuming a parametric form of the probability and cost functions that enter into the
entrepreneur￿ s problem, we can extend the linear Cournot model to derive a full solution to the
model by solving the entry fee game between governments.
Assumption A1: The probability of a successful innovation and the e⁄ort cost is determined
by z(e) = 1 ￿ exp(￿￿e2) and y(e) = ￿e2 for the domestic entrepreneur, and z(e￿) =
1 ￿ exp(￿￿e￿2) and y(e￿) = ￿e￿2 for the foreign entrepreneur.
Assume that Assumption A1 holds. In stage 4, optimal quantities are then given from






(2￿z) in stage 2.
Reduced form probabilities will now include both the domestic and the foreign entrepreneurship
policy:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
zwin
E (￿;￿￿) = z(e(￿;￿￿))[1 ￿ 0:5z(e￿(￿;￿￿))]
zwin
E￿ (￿;￿￿) = z(e￿(￿;￿￿))[1 ￿ 0:5z(e(￿;￿￿))]
zentry(￿;￿￿) = 1 ￿ [1 ￿ z￿(￿;￿￿)][1 ￿ z(￿;￿￿)]:
(3.14)
Turning to government policies in stage 1, and assuming truthful lobbying contributions, the
objective functions of the domestic and foreign government are:
G(￿;￿￿) = zwin
E (￿;￿￿)￿ + WInt
I (￿;￿￿) + WInt
E (￿;￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿Int




E￿ (￿;￿￿)￿￿ + WInt
I￿ (￿;￿￿) + WInt
E￿ (￿;￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿Int
I￿ (￿) ￿ ￿ ￿Int
E￿ (￿): (3.16)
The constants entering the domestic government￿ s problem, ￿ ￿Int






and the foreign government￿ s problem, ￿ ￿Int
h￿ (￿) = WInt
h￿ (￿
opt
h ;￿) ￿ Ch￿(￿
opt
h￿ ;￿), only depend on
the policy in the other country. Hence, these will drop out of the ￿rst-order conditions of the
two governments. The expected pro￿ts, WInt
h (￿;￿￿) and WInt
h￿ (￿), are as in (3.7), but with
probabilities depending on the policies in both countries, as shown in (3.14). Deriving the re-
16action functions ￿(￿￿) = argmax￿ G(￿;￿￿) and ￿￿(￿) = argmax￿￿ G￿(￿;￿￿) and solving for ￿
and ￿￿; we then have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In the linear Cournot model with symmetric countries and under Assumption
A1, (i) the entrepreneurship policies are strategic complements, i.e. d￿
d￿￿ > 0 and (ii) there exists
a symmetric equilibrium ￿Int and ￿Int￿
such that ￿Int = ￿Int￿
< ￿Aut.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The propositions have hitherto been conditional on incumbents￿losses due to an innovation
being smaller in autarchy than in integrated markets. This hinges on assumptions regarding
the relative size of the domestic and the foreign market and on the number of ￿rms relative
to market size in autarchy and in integrated markets. The larger is size of the foreign market
and the fewer ￿rms that serve it in autarchy, relative to the home country, the more likely is
it that this assumption is violated. Moreover, as an implication of heterogeneous ￿rms in a
Melitz (2003) model, aggregate pro￿t among incumbent ￿rms may increase when markets are
integrated.10 To make this point in our Cournot model, assume that integration is followed by
a su¢ ciently large product market concentration due to mergers or exit, leading to m < 2n
active ￿rms in the international integrated markets. We can then derive the following result:
Proposition 3. In the linear Cournot model under Assumption A1, there exists a ^ m, ^ n and ^ k
such that for 0 < m < ^ m, n > ^ n and 0 < k < ^ k : ￿Int > ￿Aut.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.6. A total surplus maximizing government
Let us now relax the assumption of a rent maximizing government. To highlight the e⁄ects,
we once more take the foreign policy as given. Starting with autarchy, we then let social
welfare be W(￿) = ￿z(￿) + ￿fz(￿)CSAut(k) + [1 ￿ z(￿)]CSAut(0)g, i.e. social welfare is the
government expected income from entry fees and the expected consumer surplus where CSAut(0)
denote the consumer surplus in the pre-innovation state and CS(k) the consumer surplus with
entrepreneurial ￿rm entry and ￿ is a preference parameter that shifts the importance attached
10We have abstracted from coordination problems in the formation of a lobbying group. Taking this into
account it is possible that the total amount of lobbying contributions from incumbents increase, if the number
of incumbent ￿rms is reduced, even if aggregate pro￿t decreases.
17to consumer welfare. Proceeding as in Section 3.4, the government￿ s objective function in (2.10)
now becomes:
max
￿ G(￿) = ￿z(￿) + WAut
I (￿) + WAut
E (￿) ￿ ￿ ￿Aut
I ￿ ￿ ￿Aut
E (3.17)
+CSAut(0) + ￿z(￿)[CSAut(k) ￿ CSAut(0)]:
It is reasonable to assume that CSAut(k) > CSAut(0), if an innovation implies lower production
costs, or higher quality products and if, at the same time, competition increases as a new
￿rm enters the product market competition. Turning to the integrated market, a symmetric




E (￿) + WInt
I (￿) + WInt
E (￿) ￿ ￿ ￿Int




CSInt(0) + zentry(￿)[CSInt(k) ￿ CSInt(0)]
￿
;
where we once more assume that CSInt(k) > CSInt(0) > 0. We can now examine how entry
barriers are a⁄ected by integration. Solving (3.17) and (3.18), we obtain:
~ ￿Aut ￿ ~ ￿Int =
￿
￿Aut



























The ￿rst line in (3.19) is once more conducive to lower entry barriers when going from
autarchy to integration, However, ambiguities arise from the second line in (3.19). Moreover, it
is plausible that the di⁄erence CSAut(k) ￿ CSAut(0) is larger than CSInt(k) ￿ CSInt(0), since
both the e⁄ect of an innovation and of an additional ￿rm increasing competition is larger in the
autarchy market. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. A higher weight ￿ on consumer surplus will tend to reduce the di⁄erence ~ ￿Aut￿
~ ￿Int, if CSAut(k) ￿ CSAut(0) > CSInt(k) ￿ CSInt(0), thereby making the e⁄ect of integration
on the entrepreneurial fee weaker.
In the Cournot model with linear demand and symmetric countries, it is veri￿ed that
18CSm(k) > CSm(0) from the increase in output due to the cost-reducing innovation and








since the entry of an innovative entrepreneurial ￿rm is more important
in the autarchy economy where the initial output is lower.
Corollary 1. Assuming that the number of ￿rms is unchanged by integration, the linear









Proof. In the Appendix.
4. Extensions
In this section, we consider two extensions. First, we allow for a global incumbent lobbying
group that can simultaneously give contributions to the domestic and the foreign policy maker.
We then study the case of entrepreneurial innovation for sale.
4.1. Global incumbent lobbying
Now, relax the assumption that incumbents can only lobby their domestic policy maker. Instead,
assume that incumbent ￿rms come together as one global lobbying group, giving contributions
to both the domestic and the foreign policy maker. Entrepreneurs are, as previously, restricted
to only lobby against their own policy maker, and the policy maker once more takes the other
policy maker￿ s fee as exogenous.
For each pair of policies (￿;￿￿), the incumbent lobbyist is willing to pay a total contribution
of LGlobal
I . This contribution is split between the domestic and the foreign policy maker: LI +
L￿
I = LGlobal
I . Extending the framework of truthful bids, introduced in section (2.4), raises
the issue of policy complementarity. The reason is that a global lobbying group will take the
change in policy of one government into account when lobbying against the other, even though
governments are assumed not interact directly. In technical terms, the amount the lobbying
group must compensate one government (Cf. eq.2.7) is decreased by a term representing the
reduction in compensation that the group must give to the policy maker in the other country.
This yields the possibility of asymmetric equilibria where all lobbying e⁄ort is concentrated
to one government. In the extreme case, a global lobby succeeds in driving the probability of
19innovation in one country to zero, e⁄ectively leaving the other country in a situation similar
to autarchy. To get around this problem, and be able to retain the notion of truthful bids,
we make the assumption that the lobbying group sends a delegate to each country. The two
delegates are each equipped with a schedule of what lobbying contributions they are allowed to
give the policy maker for any entrepreneurship policy in that country. The two delegates are
not allowed to communicate once the lobbying game has started, so that the lobbying o⁄ered
for a policy in one country is independent of the o⁄er to the other country. When devising the











I (￿;￿￿) ￿ C(￿) ￿ C￿(￿￿); (4.1)
where WGlobal
I (￿;￿￿) is the expected income of the global incumbent lobbying group. Moreover,



















, we can restrict the set of lobbying contributions to truthful ones and
state the lobbying function as:
LTot
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I (￿;￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿Global
I :
It remains to show how much of the total lobbying contribution that is spent on the domestic
and the foreign policy maker, respectively. Incumbents￿expected revenues are a function of
pro￿ts and the probability that one of the entrepreneurs is successful, zentry(￿;￿￿) = 1 ￿
[1 ￿ z(￿;￿￿)][1 ￿ z￿(￿;￿￿)]: This implies that incumbents￿revenues are maximized for fees such
that z(￿;￿￿) = z￿(￿;￿￿). Due to symmetry, this requires that ￿ = ￿￿. However, the allocation
is also dependent on the compensation functions C(￿) and C￿(￿￿), which are more involved in
the general case. If these are convex functions with C￿(￿);C￿￿(￿) > 0 and C￿
￿￿(￿);C￿
￿￿￿￿(￿) > 0,
the costs are, once more due to symmetry, minimized when ￿ = ￿￿. We can show this to hold in
our parametric example in Section 3.5. If the optimal fees for the incumbent lobbying group are
such that the policy makers set ￿ = ￿￿, this yields, by symmetry, that the lobbying contribution
20is split in two equal halves. Lobbying contributions from the incumbent lobbying group to the
domestic policy maker can, in other words, be written as:
LI(￿;￿￿) = 0:5LGlobal
I (￿;￿￿) = 0:5WGlobal
I (￿;￿￿) ￿ 0:5￿ ￿Global
I : (4.5)
Now consider the entrepreneur. Due to the presence of a global incumbent lobbying group, the
compensation that the entrepreneur will have to give the policy maker in order to deviate from
its optimal policy, absent the entrepreneur, will look di⁄erent. However, it will only change the
benchmark optimal revenues (net of lobbying contributions). The lobbying contribution from
the entrepreneur is thus the same as in (2.9), with only the constant ￿ ￿Int
h being di⁄erent.
Hence, the only di⁄erence from the case where the incumbent ￿rms were only allowed to
lobby against the policy maker in their own country is the multiple 0:5 in front of the incumbents￿
expected revenues. In the case of symmetric countries, it is easily realized that the problem,
and the optimal fee, are the same in both cases.
Proposition 5. If policy makers take the other country￿ s fee as given, and countries are sym-
metric, then under the assumption of no communication between delegates, the optimal fee
in integrated markets is not changed when incumbent ￿rms are allowed to lobby against both
policy makers.
Corollary 2. We show that in the parametric model in Section 3.5, the optimal fees for the
incumbent lobbying group are such that ￿ = ￿￿.
Proof. In the Appendix.
4.2. Entrepreneurial innovations for sale
In the analysis, we have assumed that entrepreneurs enter the market. In practice, we observe
that entrepreneurs often sell their innovation. Indeed, we observe a signi￿cant amount of inter-
￿rm technology transfers, ranging from joint ventures and licensing to outright acquisitions of
innovations.11 The venture capital industry provides some evidence of the relation between
11Granstrand and Sj￿lander (1990) present evidence from Sweden, and Hall, Berndt and Levin (1990) present
evidence from the US of ￿rms acquiring innovative targets to gain access to their technologies. Bloningen and
Taylor (2000) ￿nd evidence from US high-tech industries of ￿rms making a strategic choice between the acquisition
of outside innovators and in-house R&D. In the biotech industry, Lerner and Merges (1998) note that acquisitions
are important for know-how transfers.
21innovation for sale and innovation for entry. Figure II depicts the quarterly value of exits
through M&As and IPOs, respectively, in the US in the stage 1999 to 2005. Note that M&As
dominate as the exit mode, except at the beginning of the stage.
￿ ￿ ￿ [ FIGURE II] ￿ ￿ ￿
However, it can be shown that our identi￿ed mechanism is still valid as long as there is
bidding competition over the innovation. The reason is that the entrepreneur then exerts
similar negative externalities as in case of entry, and globalization a⁄ects these externalities in
a similar fashion. To see this, assume that all n incumbents are homogeneous and consider the
following sale model: If a sale takes place, the entrepreneur sells its innovation (￿rm) through
a ￿rst price perfect information auction with externalities. The acquisition auction is solved
for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. There is a smallest amount, ", chosen such
that all inequalities are preserved if " is added or subtracted.
In autarchy, the n incumbents simultaneously post bids, which are accepted or rejected by
the entrepreneur. In the case of the closed economy, only domestic incumbents bid and in the
case of the integrated economy, both domestic and foreign incumbents bid. Each incumbent
announces a bid, bi, where b = (b1;:::;bi;:::bn) 2 Rn is the vector of these bids. Following the
announcement of b, the innovation is sold to the incumbent with the highest bid (bi = SE). If
more than one incumbent has the highest bid, each such incumbent obtains the innovation with
equal probability. In the integrated market, there are n + n￿ incumbents bidding.
Instead of separating the incumbents￿and the entrepreneur￿ s product market pro￿ts, we
must now distinguish between the pro￿t of an acquiring and a non-acquiring incumbent ￿rm.
Denote the former ￿m
A(k) and the latter ￿m
N(k) < ￿m
A(k) for m = Aut;Int. Given this, we can
write an incumbent￿ s valuation of obtaining the innovation as:12
vm = ￿m
A(k) ￿ ￿m
N(k); m = Aut;Int: (4.6)
From this it is straightforward that:
Lemma 3. The equilibrium sale price is SE = vm.
12If the quality of the innovation k is low there is also an entry deterring valuation for incumbents. However,
for a su¢ ciently high quality k it can be shown that we need only consider (4.6)
22In a symmetric model without exits ￿m
I (k) = ￿m




I (0) = n￿m
N(0) and hence, ￿m(0) > ￿m
I (k): Thus, from Lemma 3 it follows that the previous
results carry over to the case of sale.13 We can thus state the following result:
Proposition 6. In the case with innovation for sale with a su¢ ciently large number of sym-
metric incumbents, the optimal entrepreneurial policy ￿ will be more pro-entrepreneurial when
the product and innovation markets integrate internationally, i.e. ￿Aut ￿ ￿Int > 0.
Consequently, since innovations are, by de￿nition, unique assets and bidding competition
then seems natural, our identi￿ed result also seems relevant for the case of entrepreneurs selling
their innovation.
5. Econometric Analysis
The prediction emerging from Proposition 1 suggests that globalization in terms of the inte-
gration of markets should reduce the domestic entry barriers for entrepreneurs. As shown by
Proposition 4, this e⁄ect may also be stronger in countries where governments are to a larger
extent rent extracting. Moreover, by Proposition 2, we expect entry barriers to be lower when
neighboring countries are more pro-entrepreneurial. To test these predictions, we now turn to
an empirical analysis of how barriers to entry are a⁄ected by a country￿ s international openness.
Descriptive statistics for all variables involved are put in appendix Table A.1.
5.1. Econometric Model
To examine Proposition 1, we will estimate a reduced-form model of how the international
openness of a country a⁄ects the cost of entry for domestic entrepreneurs. For country i, at
time t, we have:
Entry_costi;t = ￿0 + ￿1
(￿)
Globalizationi;t + X0
i;t￿ + ￿i + ￿t + "i;t; (5.1)
where Entry_costi;t is the entry cost, Globalizationi;t is proxied by measures of globalization,
Xi;t is a vector of controls, ￿i is a country-speci￿c e⁄ect, ￿t a time-speci￿c e⁄ect and uij is the
usual error term. From Proposition 1, the entry barriers should be negatively correlated with
measures of globalization, ￿1 < 0. We discuss all variables a⁄ecting entry barriers, the choice of
13Calculations for the post oligopoly case are available from the authors upon request.
23proxies and the data in the sections below. Descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendix,
Table A1.
To examine Proposition 4, we will augment (5.1) and compare the impact of globalization
in countries with high and low corruption where rent-seeking governments should be associated
with a higher level of corruption:







Corruptioni;t ￿ Globalizationi;t + X0
i;t￿ + ￿i + ￿t + "i;t: (5.2)
As shown by Proposition 4, we would expect countries associated with a higher level of corrup-
tion to have higher entry barriers, but also to be more strongly a⁄ected by globalization, ￿2 > 0
and ￿3 < 0. The argument is that governments in countries with a high level of corruption are
less likely to care about consumer welfare.
Our approach of establishing a correlation running from globalization to entry barriers di⁄ers
from the previous literature which has used entrepreneurial polices acting as an explanatory
variable. Table A.2 provides an overview. For instance, the level of entry barriers has been
found to be a very good predictor of the level of corruption (Svensson 2005). Entry barriers
have been discussed as a factor determining how apt a country is at using trade liberalization
to generate growth (Freund and Bolaky, 2008; Fisman and Sarria-Allende, 2004). In addition,
entry barriers have been found to have a strong negative e⁄ect on sector-level productivity and
dynamics (Klapper et al., 2006; Barseghyan, 2008). As compared to (5.1) and (5.2), previous
studies have used entry costs as an explanatory variable. While our approach is novel, this
generates a concern for endogeneity and reverse causality.14 We try to deal with this in a
number of ways.
First, we include country-speci￿c e⁄ects and use the time variation in entry barriers, whereas
previous studies have used data for one year, frequently the data for 1999 used in Djankov et al.
(2002). Second, we try to exploit the exogenous variation in globalization using the expansion of
the EU in 2004 to a number of Eastern European countries to identify the e⁄ect of globalization
on entry barriers. Third, we will try to control for an omitted variable in the form of a general
14Measures of openness may be endogenous if a reduction in entry barriers leads to the entry of export-oriented
￿rms a⁄ecting measures of openness as suggested by the recent trade literature of heterogenous ￿rms (see, for
instance, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008). In the literature on corruption, there is also an established
link between entry barriers and the level of corruption (see Svensson, 2005).
24country-speci￿c trend in institutional quality.
5.1.1. Dependent variable: Entry barriers
To proxy the cost ￿ levied on entrepreneurial entry, we will use data from the World Bank￿ s
Doing Business project. The World Bank￿ s Doing Business project was initiated by Djankov et
al. (2002), and collects country-level data on the cost of setting up a limited liability company.15
Djankov et al. (2002) collected data for entry barriers for a sample of 85 countries in 1999. The
extension of this project has collected data for approximately 120 countries since 2003. The
most recent wave in the survey is for 2007. The entry costs include o¢ cial fees and fees for
the legal or professional services needed to ful￿l the procedures required by law. The aim is
to net out uno¢ cial costs due to corruption and costs pertaining to bureaucratic ine¢ ciencies.
To control for di⁄erences in the level of development, the cost for setting up a new business is
scaled by country per capita income. To adjust for the skewness in the distribution, we will
take the log of entry costs.
5.1.2. Explanatory variable: International market integration
We use two indices to measure the international integration of product and innovation markets.
As a ￿rst measure, we use the kof index provided by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
in Zurich. Our second measure is the csgr index provided by University of Warwick.16 Data
for the csgr index is available from 1999 to 2004 and data for the kof index is available for
the period 1999-2005. Both indices cover more than 120 countries. Figure III shows a strong
negative correlation between the kof globalization index and the entry costs, giving some initial
support for Proposition 1.
￿ ￿ ￿ [ FIGURE III] ￿ ￿ ￿
The two indices build on partly overlapping sources and are constructed by similar meth-
ods capturing economic, social and political aspects of globalization. The main components of
the economic parts are trade ￿ ows and in- and out￿ ows of direct and portfolio investments.
The social parts build on information on international personal contacts and information ￿ ows.
15The same project also collects data on other dimensions of barriers to entry: the number of procedures and
the time it takes to start a new company and the capital requirement. The reason why we focus on the cost
measure is that this is the most direct and most readily interpreted aspect.
16Examples of previous studies using these indices include Dreher (2006) and Joyce (2006).
25Political globalization is measured by membership in international organizations and partici-
pation in UN missions. The main di⁄erence between the two indices pertains to the weighting
procedures.17 The indices are described in detail in appendix Table A.3.
The globalization that we have theoretically depicted contains the integration of both prod-
uct and innovation markets. How these relate to our empirical measures of economic, social as
well as political aspects is not straightforward. The foreign innovation threat and the strategic
innovation e⁄ort e⁄ects identi￿ed in (3.10) imply a negative correlation between entry barri-
ers and international integration. Arguably, these two e⁄ects are closer to political integration
such as participation in international organizations. Countries that enforce international patent
rights are more likely to see the pro￿ts of domestic incumbents being pushed down by the entry
of foreign innovative ￿rms. To some extent, a higher degree of social integration paves the way
for foreign entrants in a similar manner. Conversely, it is plausible that entry on foreign markets
is facilitated for innovators originating from countries that are highly politically and socially
integrated.
However, Proposition 1 predicted a negative correlation between entry barriers and interna-
tional integration conditional on some properties of incumbents￿pro￿ts. Empirically, it is likely
that economic integration, entailing a reduction in the barriers that a company meets when
selling on a foreign market, will a⁄ect incumbents￿pro￿ts. However, social as well as political
integration also a⁄ect the de facto barriers faced by a company when expanding its business
abroad.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no established methodology in the literature
on how to separate product and innovation market integration. In view of this, our main
explanatory variable will be the aggregate index, although we also present the results for each
sub index separately.
5.1.3. Other covariates
The cross-country e⁄ect of openness Openi;t on entry barriers Entry_costi;t in (5.1) is likely to
be confounded with a range of variables. Among these, the income level and the features of the
overall institutional setup (formal-legislative as well as their implementation) stand out as the
17Other di⁄erences are due to classi￿cation. This mainly concerns how remittances by foreign nationals are
classi￿ed. In the kof index, these are part of economic globalization whereas the csgr index considers these as
part of social globalization. Another di⁄erence is that the kof index includes a measure for cultural proximity
(proxied as the presence of multinational ￿rms such as McDonald￿ s and Ikea) as part of social globalization.
26most serious ones. In our main speci￿cation, we therefore control for country-speci￿c e⁄ects,
￿i. This mitigates the concerns with income level and other institutions.
The main omitted variable problem that remains concerns changes in institutions over the
time period studied. Formal institutions may a⁄ect both the level of globalization and the
barriers to entry. Implementation and enforcement of institutions, re￿ ected in government
e¢ ciency and the prevalence of corruption, and income level are hard to control for since these
are likely to be endogenously a⁄ected by entry barriers. However, we argue that endogeneity
may be less of a concern with respect to formal institutions. There is less reason to believe
that formal institutions, as put down in a country￿ s legislation, are in￿ uenced by legislation
speci￿cally pertaining to entry barriers.
To control for the omitted variable problem, we construct a measure intended to capture
the extent to which a country￿ s legislation is aligned to free-market valuations. This index is
constructed as the principal component of those parts of the Heritage Foundation index that
are collected from legal documents.18
When examining Proposition 4 by estimating (5.2), we also include a measure of corruption
as an interaction variable with openness. The index is the so-called KKM (Kaufmann, Kraay
and Mastruzzi, 2007) available from the World Bank.
5.2. Results
We ￿rst run di⁄erent speci￿cations of the model in eq 5.1. As shown in the ￿rst column of Table
I, openness is highly correlated with entry barriers across countries. The e⁄ect is also large, one
standard deviation decrease in the kof-index amounts to nearly a doubling of the entry costs,
and the e⁄ect of the csgr index is similar. Adding a control for other institutions in column (ii),
the e⁄ects of openness are decreased but still highly signi￿cant. The magnitudes of the e⁄ect
of the control for institutions and entry barriers are roughly equal. Adding year dummies in
(iii) does not change these results. Controlling for continent in (iv) and (v) reduces the e⁄ects,
in particular for the csgr index. The estimated coe¢ cients for openness are still signi￿cant at
conventional levels, however.
The e⁄ects are also robust to the inclusion of country-speci￿c e⁄ects in (vi). A decrease in
openness equal to one standard deviation increases the cost of entry by some 55 (kof) and 60
18These are: trade freedom (tari⁄s), ￿scal freedom (tax levels), government size (government expenditures),
￿nancial freedom (regulation of banks) and protection of property rights.
27(csgr) percent. Adding both country and time e⁄ects reduces the estimate for the kof index
below conventional signi￿cance levels. The estimates for the csgr index are still signi￿cant, the
e⁄ect of a one standard deviation change in the index amounts to a change in costs in the order
of 35 percent.
￿ ￿ ￿ [ TABLE I] ￿ ￿ ￿
Table II breaks down the indices into their subcomponents in cross-country regressions. All
three aspects of openness tend to have a negative e⁄ect on entry barriers. The strongest and
most signi￿cant e⁄ects are found for social integration. The estimates for economic openness
are weaker, however. In fact, as shown in columns (iv), the independent e⁄ect of economic
openness, when controlling for social and political integration, tends to have a positive e⁄ect
on entry costs.
In this interpretation, the weak results for economic integration presented in Table II are
consistent with the ambiguous theoretical prediction in Proposition 1 of whether the incumbent￿ s
losses from innovation increase with trade liberalization. The stronger results for a negative
e⁄ect on entry fees from political and social integration are consistent with an interpretation
where these dimensions more closely re￿ ect that globalization reduces the fee due to foreign
innovation threat and strategic innovation e⁄ort e⁄ects.
￿ ￿ ￿ [ TABLE II] ￿ ￿ ￿
Rent seeking governments Proposition 4 shows that globalization in terms of increased
openness should have a stronger e⁄ect on the entry barriers erected by governments with stronger
preferences for rent-shifting. To investigate Proposition 4, we employ interaction e⁄ects between
openness and corruption. To alleviate the concerns of endogeneity, we construct dummy vari-
ables for corruption levels above the mean. Figure IV clearly shows that the correlation between
openness and barriers to entry is much stronger in the high-corrupt subsample. The regression
results are reported in Table III. The interaction e⁄ects in columns (ii) come out as highly
signi￿cant with both corruption indices. Consistent with Proposition 4, countries that score
higher on the corruption index are those with the largest negative e⁄ect on the cost of entry
from being more open. The results are similar for the csgr and the kof index. In the latter
28case, the interaction term dominates the main e⁄ect of openness, whereas openness still has a
signi￿cant main e⁄ect with the csgr index.
￿ ￿ ￿ [ FIGURE IV] ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ [ TABLE III] ￿ ￿ ￿
Policy complements Proposition 2 shows that the entrepreneurial policies set by govern-
ments in di⁄erent countries are strategic complements. The domestic policy maker will be
induced to reduce the barriers to entry if neighboring countries set more pro-entrepreneurial
policies. One way of testing this proposition is to construct an average neighbor for each coun-
try. This is done by, for each country, summing the distance-weighted entry barriers in all other
countries in the sample. The results from this exercise are reported in Table IV. Column (i)
reports the results without country-speci￿c e⁄ects and without a time trend. The coe¢ cient on
the distance-weighted neighbors￿cost of entry is positive ￿indicating that countries with more
entrepreneurial friendly governments also have lower barriers to entry ￿and strongly signi￿cant.
This result is robust to adding a time trend in column (ii), and country-speci￿c e⁄ects in column
(iii). When we add both country-speci￿c e⁄ects and a time trend in column (iv), the estimates
only remain signi￿cant for speci￿cations using the kof index.
￿ ￿ ￿ [ TABLE IV] ￿ ￿ ￿
5.3. Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
To estimate the e⁄ects of a greater openness on entry barriers, we also employ an alternative
strategy. As an exogenous shock to openness, we use entry into the European Union. In the
2004 enlargement, 10 countries entered as new members of the EU. The selection of new EU
members was exogenous in the sense that only countries belonging to a speci￿c geographical
region are eligible to apply for membership.
Membership forced these countries to integrate their product and innovation markets into
the EU single market. However, one institutional feature that to a large extent escaped the
harmonization process was entry barriers as long as they were not discriminatory.19 Moreover,
19The Treaty of Lisbon has one paragraph where the promotion of small- and medium sized companies is
mentioned (§157). However, the wording is much vaguer than in the paragraphs stipulating commitment to free
movement of trade and services (§§23-31).
29it should be noted that although entry barriers are substantially lower in EU countries than in
other countries in the sample, there is substantial heterogeneity among EU countries.20 This
reduces the concern that new members were subject to informal pressure from other members to
reduce their barriers to entry. Hence, we argue that any variation in barriers to entry subsequent
to entering the EU is likely to be due to a changed bene￿t from protection for incumbents vis-
￿-vis entrepreneurial ￿rms.
Using countries that were members of the EU throughout the period 2000￿ 2007, we can use
a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence design to isolate the e⁄ect of entry into EU on entry barriers. Figure
V shows the trend lines for entry barriers for new EU members, old EU members and all other
countries. The new EU members clearly show a kink around 2004, after which they reduced
their entry barriers almost to the same level as the mean for old members.
￿ ￿ ￿ [ FIGURE V] ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ [ TABLE V] ￿ ￿ ￿
The decrease in cost of entry also clearly emerges from the regression results shown in Table
V where the estimate for new members is negative and signi￿cant. The average cost of entry
among the new membership was 30 percent lower in the period 2004￿ 2007 than in 2000￿ 2003.
5.4. Robustness
Considering the heterogeneity in our country sample, it might be suspected that the observed
e⁄ect of openness on entry barriers pertains to some sub-sample or is driven by outliers. The
￿rst two columns of Table VI show estimates for a sample where the income bottom or top
20-percentile of the sample has been dropped. If anything, this tends to strengthen the results.
Next, some countries that have been subjected to aid programs have been forced to comply with
some institutional improvement program. One concern is that this creates a spurious relation
between entry costs and openness for some countries. As a robustness check, we exclude sub-
Saharan countries from our sample in column (iii).
20EU countries had an average cost of starting a new business of approximately 10 percent of GDP per capita.
The same number is around 30 percent for the whole sample (excluding sub-Sahara Africa). However, whereas
countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the UK had a cost of approximately 1 percent, Spain had 16
percent, Italy 18 percent and Greece 28 percent. The numbers reported above are averages over all observed
years.
30Next, our data on entry costs is collected both from the 1999 Djankov et al. (2002) sample
and from the more recent extension of the survey. There might be some concerns about changes
in the measurement driving our result. In column (iv), we exclude observations from the older
sample, which reduces both the size and the signi￿cance of the e⁄ects. The results for the csgr
index still pass signi￿cance tests at conventional levels and are substantial in magnitude. As a
￿nal robustness check in column (v), we exclude some countries where extreme variation makes
us concerned about measurement error.
￿ ￿ ￿ [ TABLE VI] ￿ ￿ ￿
6. Conclusion
Industrial policy worldwide has shifted the attention towards small and entrepreneurial ￿rms.
Our analysis explains this as an endogenous response to the ongoing international integration
of product and innovation markets. In more open economies, it becomes more di¢ cult to
protect the pro￿ts of incumbent ￿rms from independent innovators, and innovation e⁄orts
become more intertwined across countries, thus making foreign entrepreneurs more aggressive.
This reduces the incumbents￿incentive to pay for protection against the domestic entrepreneur,
hence reducing the entry barriers. The data supports our theory by indicating a strong negative
correlation between openness and the degree of barriers to entry into entrepreneurship.
We also ￿nd that the reduction of barriers to entry into entrepreneurship is larger in more
corrupt countries. Consequently, the ongoing process of international agreement on trade and
investment such as WTO agreements (e.g. TRIPS), and the enlargement of the EU single
market program might be of particular bene￿t for entrepreneurs and consumers in the most
corrupt countries.
In our analysis, we also identify the e⁄ects of international market integration that could
make policies more anti-entrepreneurial. If international market integration is accompanied by
merger and exit waves, incumbents￿pro￿ts may increase to such an extent that their willingness
to pay to protect their market increases to such an extent that policies can become more
anti-entrepreneurial. Consequently, if entrepreneurial activity is considered to have positive
externalities on societies in general, policies preventing the internationally integrated markets
from becoming too concentrated seem warranted. Internationally active and coordinated merger
and anti-predatory policies then seem to be natural ways of achieving this.
31What other factors could explain the recent trend towards pro-entrepreneurial policies? One
potential explanation is the increased importance of international policy benchmarking. The
inception of new indices, such as, e.g., the Doing Business index, is likely to make governments
more prone to evaluate their policy relative to other countries. Theoretically, we can incorporate
this e⁄ect by showing that entrepreneurship policies are indeed strategic complements when
governments interact. We also ￿nd empirical evidence that one country￿ s entrepreneurship
policy is in￿ uenced by the policies of neighboring countries.
The existing entrepreneurship literature has typically explained the shift towards more pro-
entrepreneurial policies as a consequence of the increased advantage of small scale activities and
technological development favoring small scale production (Achs and Audretsch, 2005; Loveman
and Sengenberger, 1991; Baumol, 2002). These explanations do not contradict our explanation,
but rather interact with our political economy explanation. Exploring this interaction in detail
is left to future research.
Let us end by using our framework to brie￿ y shed some light on the world welfare e⁄ects
of product and innovation market integration when entrepreneurial innovations are present.
Starting with the e⁄ects on consumers, we note that when markets become integrated, they will
bene￿t from lower consumer prices for two reasons. First, if no innovation takes place, product
competition will be tougher, thus reducing consumer prices. Second, it is more likely that
consumers can bene￿t from the use of a successful innovation since also the foreign innovation
will be used in their market. The size of these e⁄ects will then depend on how much total e⁄ort
spending by the entrepreneurs is a⁄ected by integration and changes in policy. Moreover, the
total producer surplus might increase or decrease because competition is increased both in the
product market and in the innovation market, while more e¢ cient technology will be used and
the duplication cost will be reduced. A more detailed study of this is left to future research.
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35TABLE I 
MAIN RESULTS, EFFECTS ON COST OF ENTRY FROM OPENNESS 
  (i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii) 
Panel 1: Openness measured by the kof-index 




































Region effects  No  No No Yes  Yes  No No 
Year effects  No  No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
Country effects  No  No No No No Yes  Yes 
Obs  533  523 523 523 523 523 523 
R2  0.44  0.46 0.47 0.25 0.27 0.04 0.25 
Panel 2: Openness measured by the csgr-index 





































Region effects  No  No No Yes  Yes  No No 
Year effects  No  No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
Country effects  No  No No No No Yes  Yes 
Obs  363  360 360 360 360 360 360 
R2  0.42  0.48 0.49 0.22 0.24 0.13 0.21 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05 and * p-
value<0.1. Region effects are continent-specific effects: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, 




RESULTS BROKEN DOWN BY SUBCOMPONENT OF GLOBALIZATION INDEX 
 kof-index    csgr-index 





**    0.44 
(0.34)    -1.81 





  -3.96 
(0.41)
***   -4.47 
(0.50)
***    -3.81 
(0.40)







































Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  524 566 567  523   384 416 456 360 
R2  0.42 0.51 0.46  0.52   0.43 0.53 0.46 0.54 
Regressions do not include country-specific effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** indicates 
p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05 and * p-value<0.1. 
 
TABLE III 
INTERACTION BETWEEN OPENNESS AND LEVEL OF CORRUPTION 
 kof-index    csgr-index 
  (i) (ii)    (i)  (ii) 





























-  -2.43 
(0.88)
***












Year effects  Yes Yes    Yes  Yes 
Country Effects  No No    No  No 
Obs  523 523    360  360 
R2  0.50 0.52    0.50  0.51 
Regressions without country-specific effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** 
indicates p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05 and * p-value<0.1. 
 
 Table IV 
Policy Complements. 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
Panel 1: Openness measured by the kof-index 




































Year effects  No Yes  No Yes 
Country effects  No No Yes  Yes 
Obs  517 517 517 517 
R2  0.48 0.49 0.00 0.01 
Panel 2: Openness measured by the csgr-index 





































Year effects  No Yes  No Yes 
Country effects  No No Yes  Yes 
Obs  355 355 355 355 
R2  0.50 0.50 0.20 0.43 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01, ** p-
value<0.05 and * p-value<0.1.  
 
 TABLE V 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE RESULTS FOR NEW EU-MEMBERS 
  (i) (ii) 










Year Dummies  No Yes 
Obs  797 797 
R2  0.21 0.18 
Regressions include country-specific effects. Identification on 
countries that switch from being outside the EU to becoming members 





 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
Panel 1: Openness measured by the kof-index 
























Year effects  No No No No No 
Country effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  408 448 428 383 475 
R2  0.12 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Panel 2: Openness measured by the csgr-index 

























Year effects  No No No No No 
Country effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs  268 326 309 236 325 
R2  0.13 0.16 0.19 0.04 0.21 
Regressions include country-specific effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
*** indicates p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05 and * p-value<0.1. The following observations 
have been dropped: column (i) the top 20-percentile in income/capita; (ii) the bottom 20-
percentile; (iii) sub-Sahara countries; (iv) observations before 2002: and (v) countries with 
extreme variation (Ghana, Indonesia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria, Zambia 
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FIGURE I, PANEL A 
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FIGURE I, PANEL B 
Average Cost of Starting a New Business 2000 –2007 Among OECD Countries. 
  
FIGURE II 
The value of exits through M&A and IPO in the US. 
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FIGURE IV 



































Barriers to Entry Among New EU Members. 
 Appendix
Lemma 1
Take logs of the domestic and foreign policy makers￿FOCs:
logz0




E (k) ￿ F ￿ ￿
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logz0




E (k) ￿ F ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
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Under the assumption of stability, 0 > de￿
de > ￿1; we have that the determi-







































d￿ < 0 and de￿
















Given the pro￿ts in (3.13), we study
￿
￿Aut











(n + 1)￿2 ￿ 2(2n + 1)￿2
(n + 2)￿2 ￿ 2(2n + 2)￿2
￿
: (2)We have that
(￿)2
(￿ ￿ k)2 > 1
and
(n + 1)￿2 ￿ 2(2n + 1)￿2 > (n + 2)￿2 ￿ 2(2n + 2)￿2, for n > 1
thus ￿
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Assume probabilities on the form z(e) = 1 ￿ exp(￿￿e2) and e⁄ort cost
according to ￿e2. The ￿rst-order conditions in (3.4) and (3.5) can then be
written as:
(1 ￿ z)(2 ￿ z￿) = ￿ [2￿(￿ ￿ ￿)]
￿1
(1 ￿ z￿)(2 ￿ z) = ￿ [2(￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿]
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(2 ￿ z￿)(2 ￿ z)2 +
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￿Aut ￿ ￿Int =
￿
￿Aut






(1 ￿ 0:5z￿)(2 ￿ z)
￿￿
0:5z￿Int
E (k) + ￿Int
I (k) ￿ ￿Int
I (0)
￿











I (0) ￿ ￿Aut
I (k)
￿
! 0 as n ! 1:
Assume that n is large so that
￿Aut ￿ ￿Int ￿
￿
(1 ￿ z￿)
(1 ￿ 0:5z￿)(2 ￿ z)
￿￿
0:5z￿Int
E (k) + ￿Int
I (k) ￿ ￿Int
I (0)
￿
To prove existence of an m such that ￿Aut ￿￿Int < 0 we then need to show
that ￿
0:5z￿Int
E (k) + ￿Int
I (k) ￿ ￿Int
I (0)
￿
< 0This inequality will hold if the number of ￿rms in the integrated market m
is small and the quality of the innovation is k is su¢ ciently small. More
speci￿cally, assume m = 1 and z = 1 which gives:
￿
0:5z￿Int
E (k) + ￿Int


















where the inequality holds provided that k < 1
2￿:
Corollary 1
First, note that the LC model yields the following expressions for con-
sumer welfare
CSAut(0) = 0:5Nn2(n + 1)￿2(￿)2
CSAut(k) = 0:5N(n + 2)￿2(￿ + k + An ￿ cn)2
CSInt(0) = 0:5Nn2(2n + 1)￿2(2￿)2
CSInt(k) = 0:5N(2n + 2)￿2(￿ + k + 2n￿)2:

















First note that if we set k = 0, meaning that an entrepreneur enters with










since the entry of a new ￿rm is more important in autarchy, where the initial







with the intuition that the increase in output due to the innovation is more
important in the autarchy market with a smaller number of ￿rms.Corollary 2
To ￿nd its optimal lobbying schemes, the global incumbent lobbying
group solves the following problem
max
￿;￿￿ W(￿;￿￿) ￿ C(￿) ￿ C￿(￿￿);
where C(￿) and C￿(￿￿) are given by (4.2) and (4.3). Using the parametric





2[￿I(0) ￿ ￿I(k)] + z(￿E(k) ￿ F)
2[￿I(0) ￿ ￿I(k)] + z￿(￿￿
E(k) ￿ F)
; (3)
where ￿I(0) and ￿I(k) are the aggregate pro￿t of domestic and foreign in-
cumbent ￿rms absent and with entrepreneurial entry, respectively. Now,
assume that ￿ > ￿￿, then (by symmetry) z < z￿. This leads to a contra-
diction since the RHS of (3) is < 1, whereas the LHS is > 1. Symmetrical
reasoning leads to a contradiction if ￿ < ￿￿. Hence, to satisfy the ￿rst-order
condition, we must have that ￿ = ￿￿. 
TABLE A.I 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Year  Observations Mean  Std.dev  Min  Max 
log(cost)  2000-2008 889  2.973 1.610 -2.302  7.163 
log(cost)  2000-2005 541  3.083 1.523 -1.743  7.163 
log(cost)  2000-2004 431  3.084 1.504 -1.743  7.163 
kof  2000-2005 642  0.584 0.166 0.184 0.934 
kof 
economic 
2000-2005 756  0.634 0.197 0.119 1.000 
kof 
social 
2000-2005 847  0.522 0.216 0.106 0.954 
kof political  2000-2005 854  0.564 0.261 0.078 0.990 
csgr  2000-2004 444  0.363 0.225 0.080 1.000 
csgr 
economic 
2000-2004 584  0.154 0.082 0.062 1.000 
csgr social  2000-2004 630  0.163 0.195 0.000 0.985 
csgr 
political 
2000-2004 732  0.373 0.199 0.098 0.948 
Institution  2000-2005 706  -0.018 1.620 -3.470  4.253 










STUDIES USING THE WORLD BANK’S DOING BUSINESS INDEX. 
 Dependent  Entry  Barrier  Method  Result 
Djankov et. al., 
(2002) 
Corruption Cost,  procedures 
and time 
Cross-country regressions (N=78) controlling 
for gdp/capita. 
Positive effect (more corruption) in countries with higher 
entry barriers. 
Svensson (2005)  Corruption  Procedures  Cross-country regressions (N=60) controlling 
for gdp/capita and education. 





size and operating 
margin of firms per 
3-digit sector. 
Cost  Interaction of sector specific natural entry 
barrier and growth potential with country 
specific entry barrier due to regulation. 
In industries with low natural entry barriers, the average 
size of firms depends positively, and number of firms 
negatively, on the entry cost imposed by regulation. 
Chang, Kaltani and 
Loayza (2005) 
Growth Index  of  cost, 
procedures and time 
Panel of 80 countries over 40 years (5-year 
avg). Study interaction of openness with (time-
invariant) institutional variables.  
Openness has a positive effect on growth only in 
countries with low entry barriers. 
Barseghyan (2008)  Output per worker 
and TFP 
Cost  Cross-country IV regressions (N=50-100), with 
instruments for entry costs. Also controlling for 
human capital, corruption and business 
regulation (other than entry costs). 
Negative effect of entry costs on output per worker and 
TFP. 
Freund and Bolaky 
(2008) 
Income gdp/capita  Procedures  Cross-country regressions (N=100-126) 
studying interaction of openness with entry 
regulation.  
Finds strong negative effect of entry regulation and its 
interaction with openness on gdp/capita. 
Klapper, Laeven 
and Rajan (2006) 
Firm creation, 
average size of 




Interaction of country specific (institutional) 
entry barriers with industry specific 
characteristics (natural entry barriers) 
Higher institutional entry barriers lower entry rate in 
sectors with high natural entry barriers, leads to larger 
new entrants, and increase incumbents’ value added per 
employee.  
 TABLE A.3 
GLOBALIZATION INDICES AND THEIR SUBCOMPONENTS 
  CSGR index  KOF index 
  Variable Weight  Variable  Weight 
Exports plus imports of goods and services as a proportion of GDP  0.418  Trade (percent of GDP)   0.19 
Inflows  plus outflows of foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP  0.092  Foreign Direct Investment, flows (percent of GDP) 0.20 
Inflows  plus outflows of portfolio investments as a proportion of GDP  0.220  Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) 0.23 
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP)  0.17 
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP)  0.09 
Hidden Import Barriers  0.01 
Mean Tariff Rate  0.09 










Employee compensation paid to non-resident workers and  investment 
income from foreign assets owned by domestic residents  plus  employee 
compensation paid to resident workers working abroad and investment 
income from domestic assets owned by foreign  residents,  as a proportion of 
GDP. 
0.270 
Capital Account Restrictions  0.09 
        
Stock of foreign population as proportion of total population.  0.088  Telephone Traffic  0.09 
Inflows of foreign population as proportion of total population.  0.208  Transfers (percent of GDP)  0.01 
Worker remittances (receipts) as a proportion of GDP.  0.026  International Tourism  0.09 
Number of tourists (arrivals plus departures) as proportion of total 
population. 0.009 
Foreign Population (percent of total population) 
0.07 
International  outgoing  telephone traffic (minutes) per capita  0.003  International letters (per capita)  0.09 
Internet users as a percentage of  population  0.203  Internet Users (per 1000 people)  0.12 
Number of films imported and exported.  0.041  Television (per 1000 people)  0.12 
Sum of value of  books and newspapers imported and exported per capita 
(US dollars)  0.386 
Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) 
0.10 
Number of international letters delivered and sent  per capita  0.036  Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita)  0.12 








    Trade in books (percent of GDP)  0.08 
        
Number of foreign  embassies  in country  0.378  Embassies in Country  0.25 
Number of  UN peacekeeping operations in which country participates  0.357  Membership in International Organizations  0.28 
Number of memberships of International organisations  0.266  Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions  0.22 











      
Note that the weight refers to weight in each sub-index. For further information about sources for the specific variables we refer to (csgr)  http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index/ and  
(kof) http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. I both cases variables are normalized across time and countries. The weights are obtained as the principal component of the variables in each subindex. The 
kof index obtains the overall globalization index as the principal component of the three sub-indices, whereas the overall csgr index is the average (with equal weights) of the three sub-indices. 
In our estimations we exclude the following parts of the kof index: hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade and capital account restrictions. The index we use is 
obtained as the principal component excluding this variables 